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Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez,
to the Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs
I have been asked to appear before Parliament to inform you of the Banco de España’s man-
agement of the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets and share with you its analysis of 
the current situation of credit fl ows.
As you know, the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets is assigned to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance, which by law is responsible for administering, managing and 
directing it through an Executive Council and its Executive Committee. Yesterday’s testimony 
by the State Secretary for Economic Affairs to this Committee gave a comprehensive account 
of the management of the Fund. The Banco de España’s function is to carry out its fi nancial 
asset selection and acquisition operations and to act as the custodian bank of its portfolio. 
Every two months the Banco de España reports in detail to the Executive Committee on the 
execution of the Fund’s transactions. The fi rst of these regular reports was submitted by the 
Banco de España to the Executive Committee of the Fund, and you are familiar with it.
As described in that report, to date four auctions have been held in which a total of nearly €20 
billion was allotted. The Fund implementation work consists of entering into and settling trans-
actions which are carried out through the purchase, on a temporary or held-to-maturity basis, 
of the fi nancial assets which thereby become part of the Fund’s assets. Maintenance tasks on 
the portfolios of securities acquired are also carried out.
We are all aware that this testimony comes at a particularly delicate time, not only for the Span-
ish economy, but also for that of the world. We would have to go back at least 80 years to fi nd 
a situation of global risk comparable to this one. In these conditions, we have to avoid a sim-
plistic approach focused on facets taken in isolation from reality and from the complex environ-
ment in which they are set.
You will therefore understand why I devote my testimony not only to describing and analysing 
the information available at this time, but also to setting it appropriately in the context of the 
current developments in the international fi nancial and credit markets and in the Spanish 
economy.
Allow me, then, to begin by reviewing the most recent data available to the Banco de España 
in its dual capacity as credit institution supervisor and as producer of monetary and fi nancial 
statistics. We make these statistics available to the community regularly in our publications 
and on our website. As you undoubtedly realise, however, the collection and processing of 
the input information used to compile the statistics takes time and, at this moment, the most 
up-to-date data available relate to January, although it should be noted that they are largely 
provisional.
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance Order 3118/2008, which implements Royal Decree-
Law 6/2008, recently entrusted the Banco de España with “a four-monthly analysis of the 
general fi nancial conditions in which the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets conducts 
its activity and of developments in bank lending” to be submitted to the government, which, in 
turn, will send it to Parliament within the framework of the scheduled parliamentary control of 
this Fund’s activities. Once this has taken place, we will have full information on the fi rst quar-
ter of this year.
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Hence, taking January as the reference month, Spanish household and corporate credit are, 
on the available information, growing at a year-on-year rate of nearly 6% (5.8%). In net terms, 
i.e. subtracting the effect of past loan repayments, this sector received approximately €110 
billion of fi nancing in the past 12 months.
A breakdown of these fi gures by market segment shows differences of some size between 
fi rms and households. House purchase loans to households were growing at a rate of nearly 
4% (4.2%), which was faster than that of loans for consumer and other purposes (3%).
Funds granted to fi rms, however, showed greater dynamism, with rates of around 6% (6.1%). 
This rate, however, masks signifi cant differences between different productive sectors. It 
should be noted that the information allowing this sectoral breakdown becomes available with 
a certain lag, but there are no signs that there will be a break in the existing trends, which have 
been showing a much sharper slowdown in fi nancing to construction fi rms and those engag-
ing in real estate development services and a smaller loss of momentum in fi nancing to indus-
try and to other services fi rms.
It is highly likely, in any event, that part of this corporate credit growth refl ects not so much the 
most recent lending decisions of banks as a much more intensive use by non-fi nancial corpo-
rations of credit lines opened in the past under less demanding conditions than those cur-
rently prevailing, which allow institutions little or no leeway to take action.
Along these same lines, I wish to point out that the dynamism refl ected by year-on-year growth 
rates diminishes notably when a time horizon shorter than one year is considered. Hence, 
looking at only the last three months from November 2008 to January of this year, the growth 
rate of credit to other resident sectors, expressed in year-on-year terms for comparison pur-
poses, drops to values a little above 2% (2.1%). This is equivalent to an increase of €10 billion 
in the outstanding balance of the total credit granted by institutions resident in Spain in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, or, in annual terms, somewhat more than €40 billion.
To put this lending behaviour in Spain into context, it is useful, as an initial point of reference, 
to compare it with bank lending in other major developed countries, although taking care to 
keep in mind that in some of them (specifi cally, the United States) credit institutions play a 
much less active role in the provision of fi nancing to fi rms, which raise funds directly on the 
market to a much greater extent than in Spain.
Allow me, for the sake of brevity, to spare you the detail of the fi gures and simply to say that 
what that comparison shows is that the loss of dynamism in credit is shared by most econo-
mies, including most notably the euro area, United Kingdom and United States. In Spain, the 
slowdown has been more marked because it started from higher levels, but the process here 
has not so far reached the seriousness it has in those other economies.
Another key point of reference is how credit behaved in other economic slumps. From this 
standpoint, the adjustment of credit should not surprise us, since it is a variable with a marked 
cyclical behaviour: when the economy grows, bank lending tends to do so at a comparatively 
faster rate, so the debt ratios of the private sector increase. By contrast, cyclical downturns 
are accompanied by a rapid contraction of credit growth, which tends to stand below that of 
GDP, and the relative debt of households and fi rms decreases.
The behaviour of Spanish credit and GDP fi ts exactly the pattern I have just described. In the 
last recession in Spain, at the end of 1993, bank lending contracted year-on-year by some-
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what more than two percentage points (2.2%), a short time after nominal GDP growth reached 
a minimum only slightly above zero. And that was in the absence of fi nancial strains compara-
ble to those seen at present.
In just one month, we will make public our growth projections for the Spanish economy, con-
tinuing the practice commenced two years ago. As you will undoubtedly understand, I am 
unable to give specifi c fi gures. Nonetheless, the still largely unrevised fi gures clearly point to a 
recession of some depth, as do the projections being issued by other organisations, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the OECD.
The Spanish economy is unquestionably passing through a period of contraction with low in-
fl ation, which will make for an extremely modest, if not negative, growth rate. As seen in the 
past, a situation like this would, by itself, be expected to lead to very weak or even negative 
credit expansion.
It is now necessary to superimpose on this scenario the further contractionary affects on lend-
ing derived, on one hand, from the severity of the crisis of confi dence accompanying the cur-
rent recession and, on the other, from the marked fi nancial stress inevitably accompanying the 
serious events at worldwide level, with major bank failures which required voluminous and 
exceptional rescue plans in the countries affected.
I thus wish to begin my assessment of the credit situation in Spain by looking, fi rst, at the 
reasons why the strong contraction of the Spanish economy inevitably affects lending. I 
leave for later a consideration of the more direct effects of the crisis in the international 
fi nancial markets.
As in the case of so many other goods and services, the observed credit behaviour results 
from different forces operating both on the demand side and on the supply side and which, in 
this case, are tightly synchronised with the business cycle.
Economic downturns are characterised, fi rst, by a widespread decline in household and cor-
porate spending, which naturally means that less funds are needed to fi nance that spending. 
Also, fi rms’ and workers’ expectations about their future income and, in the case of the latter, 
about their employment prospects, are usually revised downwards in recessions, especially if 
the recession resulted from a need to correct the imbalances accumulated during the expan-
sionary phase of the cycle. Obviously this revision of their future ability to pay naturally also has 
a contractionary affect on the demand for credit.
From early 2003 the Banco de España, in coordination with the other Eurosystem central 
banks, has been carrying out a regular quarterly survey of credit institutions to improve our 
knowledge of the euro area credit markets: the bank lending survey. It is one of the few tools 
which allows us to separate the components of demand and supply underlying observed 
credit behaviour. The bank lending survey clearly shows that private-sector demand for credit 
has been declining in Spain since late 2006. This is before the international credit crisis broke 
out and more in line with the fi rst incipient signs of an adjustment to the Spanish economy, the 
pace of which was subsequently accelerated by that same crisis.
The fall-off in demand, however, is insuffi cient to explain alone the strong slowdown in lending. 
The cyclical position of the economy also plays a central role in the behaviour of the supply of 
fi nancing. When GDP growth turns negative and unemployment increases, households and 
fi rms fi nd it more diffi cult to keep up their debt repayments. This means that funds which, in 
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other circumstances, could have added to the fl ow of credit, have to be set aside by credit 
institutions to cover growing bad debts. This increase in bad debts is evident in Spain, al-
though it started from fairly low levels and Spanish banks have a signifi cant cushion of provi-
sions to enable them to cope with this increase in defaults.
From a more medium-term standpoint, the same phenomenon of downward revision of ex-
pectations as to the economy’s future dynamism which adversely affects credit demand also 
puts pressure on institutions which, faced with the change of cycle, will tend to correct up-
wards their assessment of the risks associated with their operations and therefore tighten their 
conditions for new lending.
Institutions’ responses to the bank lending survey confi rm that these supply effects are having 
a major impact on the recent behaviour of credit in Spain. More specifi cally, the bank lending 
survey shows that the tightening which is taking place is basically due to a revision of bank 
expectations about economic growth in general, about the future of specifi c markets of great 
importance for credit, such as housing, and about the solvency of consumers.
Other factors, such as diffi culties in funding loans or the potential constraints associated with 
the desired levels of capitalisation, which are more directly linked to the crisis currently beset-
ting the international fi nancial markets, play a less signifi cant role. However, their infl uence may 
be beginning to increase and they may take their place alongside the traditional cyclical deter-
minants of credit supply.
In past testimonies I have described in detail how, for various reasons, this international fi nan-
cial crisis found Spanish credit institutions in a position of relative strength, which enabled 
them to withstand the initial onslaught relatively unscathed. However, the prolongation of those 
tensions and, above all, the negative feedback between the fi nancial and real sectors to which 
they have given rise, have generated indirect or induced second-round affects. Averting some 
of these indirect effects will be complicated.
Among those which should not be cause for great concern are the effects linked to the persist-
ence of a problem of lack of liquidity in the money markets. When liquidity strains become 
chronic, this increases the danger that they will ultimately degenerate into insolvency. How-
ever, this risk has been substantially covered by the action taken by the Eurosystem, which has 
substantially enlarged the volume of liquidity it provides to institutions, and has extended, also 
amply, the range of securities it accepts as collateral in those loans. The Eurosystem’s manifest 
readiness to pursue this policy as long as the tensions last strengthens my conviction that this 
type of risk will no longer constitute a determining constraint.
However, apart from liquidity problems, the evident excesses committed in many countries 
during a long period of markedly lax fi nancial conditions are now forcing widespread delever-
age among fi nancial intermediaries, which are now fi nding that their capital levels are limiting 
their ability to grant loans. The information available at this time does not yet indicate that in 
Spain this affect is signifi cant, but it is obviously a source of risk to be taken into account.
Also, the ongoing state of collapse of the international wholesale markets in which Spanish in-
stitutions had been borrowing most of the funds needed to fi nance excess domestic spending 
poses signifi cant challenges for the Spanish fi nancial system. The temporary solutions under-
taken in the face of the fi rst wave of direct effects of the crisis – and I naturally refer to the re-
course to the Eurosystem and to the issuance of commercial paper – are useful, but limited in 
scope. As in the case of deleverage, our analyses do not reveal that the funding diffi culties are 
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playing a determining role at this time, but do suggest that their infl uence on institutions’ credit 
policies is increasing.
Last but not least, the beginning of a recession, particularly one set against a backdrop of fi -
nancial crisis, is a phase prone to the overreaction so common in fi nancial markets. The ten-
dency to overreact may lead institutions to exaggerate the risks of borrowers and, conse-
quently, give rise to an excessive contraction of the credit supplied by them.
All these risks of credit restriction resulting from the need for deleverage, from the insuffi cient 
funds available on wholesale markets and from the tendency to overreact are not by any 
means exclusive to Spanish institutions. On the contrary, some of them have already material-
ised, with clearly severe effects, for certain institutions in other countries. In response to them, 
exceptional measures have been adopted in various countries and headway has been made 
in the design of common concerted guidelines in some areas, such as the European Union. 
The variety of experience gained from these interventions allows an inventory of the tools used 
to be compiled. This gives a better idea of those available and of their potential effi cacy in
correcting the adverse lending conditions.
The fi rst set of measures aims to stop the lack of confi dence from spreading through the bank-
ing system. These mutual misgivings arose as a result of the stress to which certain specifi c 
banks, none of them Spanish, were subject at the onset of the crisis. In view of the imminent 
danger of a bank panic, which could have brought the simultaneous collapse of the fi nancial 
system in various countries, the coverage provided by deposit guarantee funds was extended 
and, more generally, the authorities undertook not to allow possible bankruptcies to harm 
depositors. I do not believe I am being over-optimistic when I affi rm that this objective was 
fully achieved.
Action was also taken to ensure the availability of liquidity at maturities exceeding those cur-
rently envisaged in monetary policy operations, even after the increase in the amounts and 
maturities of the customary Eurosystem auctions. The creation in Spain of the Fund for the 
Acquisition of Financial Assets is a good example of the type of specifi c instruments designed 
in this regard to provide liquidity at longer time horizons.
The countries most affected by the crisis have also taken measures to prevent the process of 
credit institution deleverage from adversely affecting their ability to fi nance spending projects, 
through the recapitalisation of banks with government funds and the introduction of pro-
grammes to purchase impaired bank assets. As you know, none of these actions has been 
necessary in Spain, although the royal decree-law of last October established the legal basis 
to carry out recapitalisation operations, if and when necessary. In view of the enormous uncer-
tainty as to the outcome of this international fi nancial crisis, it would not seem prudent to rule 
out the possible use of measures of this type at some later time in the process.
As is well-known, Spanish institutions’ balance sheets are free from so-called “toxic” assets. 
This has been a key factor in their resilience to the initial onslaught of the crisis and represents 
a major difference from what is happening in the national fi nancial systems most severely af-
fected by the crisis. However, this does not mean that Spain’s fi nancial system will be immune 
to the processes which the fi nancial crisis has unleashed.
In any event, if the depth of the fi nancial crisis and the accompanying deterioration of the mac-
roeconomic environment do fi nally bring a reorganisation of the Spanish fi nancial system, we 
must not overlook another singular strength of Spain’s institutional framework. Unlike other 
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countries, Spain has deposit guarantee funds which are fi nanced by contributions from the 
sector itself and, if necessary, can play an important role in possible operations to restructure 
a given institution. They have proved to be very effective in situations of this type in the past, 
and have thus built up experience and a reputation which may be very useful.
Nearly 20 months have passed since the international fi nancial crisis broke out. During this 
time the Spanish banking system has demonstrated its soundness and solvency. But this 
does not mean that it is immune to the most serious worldwide economic and fi nancial 
crisis of recent times. As remarked earlier, the depth of the crisis may require a restructur-
ing of our banking system. If so, the Banco de España will act as it always has: with the aim 
that neither depositors nor creditors are affected at all. And, naturally, with discretion and 
professionalism.
Returning now to the range of measures taken, particular mention should be made of those 
designed to address the funding diffi culties in international wholesale markets through the 
provision of government guarantees for the bond issues of institutions which meet certain re-
quirements. The European Commission has designed a common framework for the provision 
of these guarantees in Europe, in order to reduce to a minimum possible harmful effects on 
competition and equal treatment. In numerous countries, including Spain, institutions are al-
ready making use of these facilities and, although their introduction is not free from complica-
tions, market funding is again becoming possible, which means that one of the most serious 
factors of blockage is being overcome. Nonetheless, the funding available continues to be 
scant and expensive, since savers are still providing funds very cautiously and only in ex-
change for high remuneration.
This brief review would not be complete without mentioning another set of important measures 
aimed at mitigating the effects that the tighter credit conditions may have on specifi c sectors 
or agents that are highly vulnerable to market strains of this type. This type of action includes, 
for example, diverse measures to help small and medium-sized enterprises gain access to 
funds or to enable households in particular diffi culty to renegotiate the terms and conditions of 
their loans. Along these lines, fi nancing programmes to provide substantial amounts to these 
sectors have been undertaken through the Instituto de Crédito Ofi cial (Offi cial Credit Institute) 
in Spain.
The range of measures available is thus extensive. The challenges and complications are so 
formidable that the most severely affected countries are still striving to fi nd suitable mecha-
nisms and not a day passes without some new proposal being put forward. However none of 
these measures is free from risk, and not only in terms of their possible adverse effects on 
competition or equal treatment. Most of these actions require, in one way or another, a con-
siderable budgetary effort by the State, so it is essential to fi nd a mechanism that does not 
jeopardise the long-term soundness of public fi nances. Also, great care should be taken that 
appropriate terms and conditions are required of the institutions which benefi t from the meas-
ures, and close attention should be paid to the design of suitable mechanisms for monitoring 
the proper use of the aid.
Having completed my analysis of recent credit behaviour and of the measures taken to deal 
with the current fi nancial stress, I feel it would be particularly useful to devote the last part of 
this testimony to commenting on the perspective from which the current credit restrictions in 
the Spanish economy should be analysed. In my judgment, this analysis should start from two 
basic premises. The fi rst is the recognition that lending behaviour in Spain cannot be decou-
pled from the existence of a global fi nancial crisis, the solution to which cannot be signifi -
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cantly infl uenced by us. The second is that the crisis hit Spain at a time when the economy 
was already in the midst of an adjustment which would in any case have had a major contrac-
tionary effect on fund supply and demand.
If these premises are ignored, there is a danger that, driven by a our wish to fi nd a remedy for 
the fi nancial stress of households and fi rms, we may make a mistaken diagnosis based on 
simplistic explanations which leads us to believe that the solution lies in mechanical formulas 
that, far from providing relief, may, in the fi nal analysis, be counter-productive.
It is not now diffi cult to identify some of these dangers in the voices and proposals heard in 
certain countries in favour of economic nationalism and protectionism, based on the false 
belief that a return to defending the national interest can protect each economy from the af-
fects of a global contractionary spiral. The results of this strategy are well-known: when each 
country goes its own way and tries to protect itself, the result is to magnify the global reces-
sionary trend. That was the most destructive force in the Great Depression and is a lesson that 
we should not forget.
Relief from the economic strains necessarily requires concerted and coordinated action be-
tween the largest-possible number of countries. This action will have to restore confi dence to 
the fi nancial markets, promote the restructuring of fi nancial institutions and encourage spend-
ing. In a framework of freedom of trade and of fi nancial transactions, the coordination of na-
tional policies strengthens and multiplies their effects, thereby magnifying the expansionary 
waves emanating from them. The evident corollary of this reasoning is that any action plan 
undertaken must necessarily mesh with internationally adopted agreements.
Further, we should not make the mistake of isolating the recent behaviour of lending in Spain 
from the other factors shaping the current severe adjustment of the Spanish economy. Nothing 
would be more counter-productive than to take the simplistic view that overcoming the crisis 
depends solely on the availability of abundant credit fi nancing.
Before anglicisms like subprime, conduit and others became part of our common vocabulary, 
a series of internal imbalances had been building up in the Spanish economy and eroding its 
dynamism, making adjustment inevitable. This adjustment might have been gradual if the in-
ternational circumstances had not changed so dramatically. In any event, given the unfortu-
nate coincidence of the domestic adjustment with extraordinarily adverse external conditions, 
the recovery of confi dence – additionally dented by the exceptional events taking place on a 
worldwide scale – and the resumption of spending – hit by numerous contractionary
factors – will only be possible if the groundwork has been laid for the absorption of the accu-
mulated imbalances.
The resumption of lending undoubtedly forms part of the solution, but this solution requires the 
right conditions for households and fi rms to regain confi dence in their future income and to lay 
solid foundations for their plans to embark on consumer spending or investment or, in the case 
of fi rms, job creation. On previous occasions I have referred to the current phenomena as the 
result of the confl uence of a series of vicious circles which feed back into each other. Consum-
ers spend less because they are worried about their future income. Firms invest less and re-
cruit fewer workers because they expect less demand and face greater fi nancial diffi culties. 
Banks lend less because they raise less funds and fear for the solvency of borrowers. They are 
vicious circles which are unlikely to be broken at a single point. The level of confi dence and the 
tone of expectations determine not only spending decisions and the demand for fi nancing, but 
also the perception of risk and credit standards. And the recovery of confi dence in the im-
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provement of expectations, although not unrelated to the course of the International crisis, will 
depend largely on how well the economy can cope with the prevailing adverse circumstances 
and overcome the current challenges.
We must also realise that, in any possible post-crisis scenario, credit conditions will necessar-
ily be more limited and tighter than before the crisis. During the long expansionary phase, 
Spanish household and corporate debt grew at rates which the Banco de España repeatedly 
described as unsustainable. In my judgment, it is unlikely that this economy can fi nd its way 
back to a path of sound and sustained reactivation of spending without previously making 
headway in the process of fi nancial restructuring of the private sector now under way.
The Spanish fi nancial system will also have to adapt to these new conditions. Its good overall 
health is of prime importance to the Spanish economy, but we must take care that such 
soundness is preserved in the current conditions of fi nancial stress and macroeconomic dete-
rioration. It is not credible to invoke scenarios of recovery of fi nancing fl ows that are not under-
pinned by a solid and profi table system of intermediaries. If the Spanish fi nancial system were 
severely weakened, as has occurred in other countries, the fi nancing of the economy would 
become even more diffi cult and growth would suffer to a greater extent.
Moreover, the re-establishment of an appropriate basis for the recovery of confi dence and for 
the resumption of private-sector spending plans largely depends on whether the adjustment 
to the economy results in improved competitiveness and labour market conditions. After 
various years of vigorous job creation, we have now moved into a phase in which jobs are 
being destroyed and unemployment is rising more quickly than in previous recessions. This 
refl ects the persistence of certain structural features of our labour market which do not cause 
problems when the economy is expanding, but which tend to put the burden of adjustment 
excessively on employment when the cycle changes. What this contributes to is that con-
sumption contracts more sharply than disposable income and that the contraction in invest-
ment is not limited to the residential component, where the need for adjustment is evident, 
but that it also sharply affects other productive investment. The spillover of contractionary 
trends driven by rising unemployment is also transmitted to bad debts, bank asset quality 
and, in short, the tightening of credit conditions. And in these conditions it is very likely that a 
signifi cant part of the possible expansionary thrust that may be generated will not effectively 
pass through to spending.
All this is suffi ciently illustrative of the complexity underlying the current economic and fi nancial 
contraction, in the framework of the fi rst global credit crisis in recent economic history. I hope 
I have been able to get across the idea that the credit strains cannot be considered in isolation. 
The corollary of this – and here I will fi nish – is that any effective action programme must pre-
scribe coordinated action on various fronts so as to tackle simultaneously all the not inconsid-
erable challenges facing the Spanish economy at this time. This is the approach adopted at 
international level, and we also have to follow suit, adapting it to the particularities of the
adjustment process under way and of the specifi c situation of Spain’s fi nancial system.
Thank you
25.2.2009.
